Research

Five questions, answered from the data.

Each note takes a question that comes up when you research markets, answers it from public data that goes back decades, and says where the answer stops being useful. Every chart is computed from the source files named under it. The notes describe what has happened; they do not forecast what will.

  1. 01Does an inverted yield curve mean a recession is coming?Macro
  2. 02How often does the market have a truly bad month?Risk
  3. 03Does diversification hold up when markets fall?Portfolios
  4. 04Does a high valuation tell you what the next ten years will return?Valuation
  5. 05How long can a well-documented premium go missing?Backtesting
01Macro · interest rates

Does an inverted yield curve mean a recession is coming?

Often, but with a long and uneven delay, and not every time. Since 1953 the ten-year Treasury yield has fallen below the three-month bill rate ahead of 7 of the 10 US recessions the data can see, with a lead of 6 to 17 months. It has also inverted twice with no recession in the two years that followed.

In brief
7 of 10
recessions since 1953 had an inversion begin in the 24 months before
9 months
median lead from the first inverted month to the recession
25 months
the inversion from November 2022, the longest in the series, with no recession dated since

The yield curve is what you get by plotting what the US government pays to borrow for different lengths of time. It normally slopes upward, because lenders want more for tying money up for ten years than for three months. When it slopes the other way, the bond market is pricing short-term rates to fall, which usually means it expects the Federal Reserve to cut because the economy is weakening. That is the whole theory, and it is why an inversion gets so much attention.

Exhibit 1

The spread has gone negative before most recessions since the late 1960s

Ten-year Treasury yield minus three-month Treasury bill rate, monthly average, percentage points, April 1953 to August 2026. Grey bands are US recessions as dated by the NBER. Red fill: months with the curve inverted.

Point at the chart to read a month.

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.15, series GS10 and TB3MS; recession indicator USREC; all via FRED®, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Suros calculations.

Read the chart from the left and the rule looks weaker than its reputation. The recessions of 1957, 1960 and 1990 arrived with the spread narrowing but still above zero. On this measure the signal belongs mostly to the period after 1966, and the table below gives every case, including the misses.

Exhibit 2

Lead times have been too uneven to time anything with

Each US recession since 1953, the first inverted month in the 24 months before it, and the lowest spread in that window. The last two rows are inversions that no recession followed within two years, with the lowest spread each one reached.

Source: as Exhibit 1. Suros calculations.

The false starts matter as much as the hits. The curve inverted for 5 months in 1966 and the economy kept growing until the end of the decade. The inversion that began in November 2022 lasted until November 2024, reached −1.57 points at its deepest, and the NBER has not dated a recession since. The NBER dates recessions many months after they begin, so for now that reads as "not yet" rather than "no".

One of the hits deserves an asterisk. The 2019 inversion counts because a recession began nine months later, but that recession was caused by a pandemic, and no bond market saw it coming. The tally flatters the signal by at least one.

Method

Monthly averages of daily yields from the Federal Reserve's H.15 release, as published on FRED (GS10 and TB3MS). The bill rate is quoted on a discount basis, which reads slightly lower than a bond-equivalent yield, so this spread sits a little above the ten-year-minus-three-month series some studies use. An inversion is a month with a negative spread, and runs separated by three months or less count as one. A recession counts as preceded when an inversion began in the 24 months before its first month on the NBER-based indicator. The 1953 recession began four months after the series starts, so it is left out of the count.

In the terminal (beta members), Calendar carries the Fed path: the policy rate the futures market is pricing for each coming meeting, beside the releases that move it.

02Risk · return distributions

How often does the market have a truly bad month?

More often than the bell curve says. In 1,202 months of US stock market returns since July 1926, a normal distribution with the same average and spread would expect about 3.2 months more than three standard deviations from the mean. There were 17, and 11 of them were falls.

In brief
17 against 3.2
months beyond three standard deviations, actual against the bell curve
−28.7%
the worst month, September 1931
−84%
the deepest fall from a peak, August 1929 to June 1932, with dividends reinvested

Most of the risk numbers you will meet, from volatility to value at risk, start from the standard deviation. It is a good summary of an ordinary month. It says much less about the months that matter, because under a normal distribution a move of four standard deviations should turn up about once in 1,300 years of monthly data. This sample has 9 of them in a hundred.

Exhibit 3

The tails are fatter than the bell curve allows

Monthly total return of the US stock market, July 1926 to August 2026, number of months in each one-point band. Dashed line: a normal distribution with the same mean (0.97%) and standard deviation (5.29%). Red: months beyond three standard deviations. The log scale keeps the single months in the tails visible; switch to linear to see the peak in proportion.

Source: US stock market factor returns, monthly, market excess return plus the one-month Treasury bill rate. Suros calculations.

The middle is different too. More months sit close to the average than the normal curve predicts, and fewer sit a moderate distance away. Excess kurtosis of 7.3 measures the two effects together: a market with more quiet months, more violent ones, and fewer in between than the bell curve would give it.

A histogram shows how often. It does not show what a bad run feels like from inside, which is what an investor has to live through.

Exhibit 4

Four falls of more than 40% in a century, and one that took fifteen years to repair

Decline from the previous peak in the value of $1 invested in the US market with dividends reinvested, month-end, before inflation.

Point at the chart to read a month.

Source: as Exhibit 3. Suros calculations.

Exhibit 5

The five deepest drawdowns

Month-end values, dividends reinvested, before inflation.

Source: as Exhibit 3. Suros calculations.

The 1929 fall took until January 1945 to recover, 15 years even with every dividend reinvested. The other four falls in the table took between three and six years to make back.

Method

The monthly market return is Mkt-RF plus RF from the three-factor file: the value-weighted return, dividends included, of all US stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. The mean and standard deviation are those of the full sample, and the normal curve is drawn with them. A drawdown is the fall in the compounded value from its highest month-end so far.

In the terminal (beta members), Stress test replays historical episodes such as the 2008 crisis against what you hold now, and names the lines that produced the loss.

03Portfolios · correlation

Does diversification hold up when markets fall?

Less well than it does the rest of the time. Across 401 quarters since 1926, the average correlation between ten US industry portfolios was 0.79 in the worst tenth of quarters for the market and 0.64 in the rest. The worst quarters are exactly where diversification was supposed to earn its keep.

In brief
0.79 against 0.64
average correlation between industries, worst tenth of quarters against the rest
0.63
the same in the best tenth: big rises do not pull industries together, falls do
0.08
the reading for the 63 trading days to 31 August 2026, the lowest in the series

Correlation measures how closely two returns move together, from 1 for lockstep to 0 for no relation at all. Ten industry portfolios is a deliberately blunt test. Each one holds hundreds of stocks, and between them they cover the whole market. If the line between energy and healthcare fades in a sell-off, the line between two stocks you picked will fade too.

Exhibit 6

Correlations jump in a crash and ease in the recovery

Average of the 45 pairwise correlations between the daily returns of ten US industry portfolios, over a rolling window of 63 trading days (about three months), plotted every ten trading days, July 1926 to August 2026. The window smooths the line, so each point describes the three months before it.

Point at the chart to read a date.

Source: ten US industry portfolios, daily, value-weighted. Suros calculations.

The peaks line up with the crises you would name: 1929, 1987, 2008 and 2020. The highest reading, 0.94, came in October 1987, when almost everything fell on the same day. The next chart asks the question more directly, one quarter at a time.

Exhibit 7

Bad quarters pull industries together, and good quarters do not push them apart

Each dot is one calendar quarter: the market's total return (across) and the average correlation between the ten industries' daily returns in that quarter (up). Yellow points: the average of each tenth of quarters, sorted by market return. Two quarters above +45%, both in 1932 and 1933, are pinned to the right edge.

Point at a dot to read the quarter.

Source: ten US industry portfolios and the three market factors, daily. Suros calculations.

A straight regression line through these dots would explain only 5% of the variation, and it would suggest there is little to see. That is because the effect is one-sided: correlation rises in falling quarters and does not drop in rising ones, so a single straight line averages the two halves into something flat. The averages by tenth show the shape a line hides, which is why the chart uses them.

The latest reading is unusually low. Low correlation is what makes a portfolio look well diversified, and it is a description of calm markets. The history above shows what a sell-off has tended to do to it.

Method

Daily value-weighted returns of the ten industry portfolios in the source data: consumer non-durables, durables, manufacturing, energy, technology, telecoms, shops, healthcare, utilities and other. For each window the Pearson correlation of every pair is computed and the 45 are averaged. The quarterly market return compounds the daily market return (Mkt-RF plus RF). Quarters with fewer than 40 trading days are left out.

In the terminal (beta members), Risk draws the correlation heatmap for your own holdings and names the window it was estimated on.

04Valuation

Does a high valuation tell you what the next ten years will return?

It says something about the next ten years and very little about the next one. Fit a line through the S&P Composite's real return against its cyclically adjusted P/E at the start, and the line explains 26% of the variation in ten-year returns since 1881, 14% of five-year returns and 4% of one-year returns.

In brief
2.4% a year
average real return over the ten years after a CAPE of 25 or more (144 months)
10.3% a year
the same after a CAPE below 12 (433 months)
35.2
the CAPE in the latest month of the dataset, September 2024

CAPE is the index price divided by the average of the last ten years of earnings, both adjusted for inflation. Averaging over ten years takes out the business cycle, so a recession's collapse in profits does not make the market look expensive just as prices are falling. Robert Shiller popularised the measure, and the monthly data behind it go back to 1871.

Exhibit 8

The relationship tightens as the horizon lengthens

Each dot is one month from January 1881: the CAPE at the start (across) against the annualised real total return of the S&P Composite over the following one, five and ten years (up). Black line: least-squares fit. Yellow rule: the latest CAPE in the dataset.

Source: long-run monthly S&P Composite data, real total return price and CAPE. Suros calculations.

In the ten-year panel, each ten points of CAPE has come with about 4.0 percentage points less real return a year. That is the useful reading. The less useful one is to treat the line as a forecast. The dots sit a typical 4.4 points a year either side of it, which is the difference between doubling your money in real terms over a decade and barely keeping up with inflation.

The high end of the chart is thinner than it looks. The ten years after a CAPE of 25 or more ranged from −5.9% to 9.8% a year, and almost all of those months fall in two episodes, the late 1920s and the years around 2000. The dataset's latest CAPE of 35.2 sits beyond most of that history, which says prices are high relative to past earnings and says nothing about when that changes.

Method

The monthly S&P Composite data: the real total return price (dividends reinvested, deflated by the consumer price index) and CAPE. The forward return is the annualised change in the real total return price over the following 12, 60 or 120 months. Each fit is ordinary least squares of that return on CAPE. The last month with a full ten years ahead of it is September 2014.

In the terminal (beta members), Valuation applies the same idea to one company: its reverse model solves for the growth the current price already assumes.

05Factors · backtesting

How long can a well-documented premium go missing?

Longer than most people will stick with a strategy. The value premium, cheap stocks held against expensive ones, has returned 3.6% a year since 1926 before costs. From December 2006 to September 2020 it lost −58% of its value.

In brief
14%
of all ten-year spells lost money for value; 35% for size, 13% for the market over cash
−78%
momentum's deepest fall, June 1932 to September 1939
Six of six
factors in the table below have had at least one decade with a negative return

A factor is a rule for sorting stocks, held as a long-short portfolio: buy the stocks at one end of the sort and sell short the ones at the other. Size, value, momentum, profitability and investment are the best documented of them, with records that run back decades. The heatmap shows why a long record is not the same thing as a dependable one.

Exhibit 9

Every factor has lost money over at least one decade

Annualised return of each long-short factor by decade, before costs. Market is the market's return over one-month Treasury bills. * Part decade: the data starts in July 1926 (momentum in January 1927, profitability and investment in July 1963) and ends in August 2026. The last column is the share of all rolling ten-year spells with a negative return.

Source: US factor returns, three factors, five factors (2x3) and momentum, monthly. Suros calculations.

Exhibit 10

The long record includes long losses

Value of $1 invested in each long-short factor, monthly, log scale, before costs. The shaded span is the deepest fall from a peak, and the figure beside it is its size.

Source: as Exhibit 9. Suros calculations.

This is the backtester's problem in its plainest form. A rule can work for eighty years and then spend fourteen losing money, and nothing in the first eighty would have told you when. When a backtest of your own draws a smooth line, the question to ask is how much of the history sat in a shaded stretch like these, and whether you would still have been running the rule at the end of it.

Method

Factors from the published academic factor files. Market (Mkt-RF), size (SMB) and value (HML) come from the three-factor file, profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) from the five-factor 2x3 file, and momentum (Mom) from its own file. Monthly returns are compounded; each decade's figure is annualised from the months that fall in it. A ten-year spell is any run of 120 consecutive months.

In the terminal (beta members), Backtest can hold back the end of the history and score a rule only on data its parameters never saw, with walk-forward folds and the parameter surface in the advanced view.

Method and sources

How these notes are made

Every figure on this page is computed from the public files listed below, downloaded on 2026-09-28. A script turns them into the data files the charts are drawn from, and the numbers in the text are checked against those files by the site's own tests, so the prose and the charts cannot quietly disagree. The charts are drawn in your browser. If a data file does not load, the exhibit says so and shows nothing in its place.

  1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.15 Selected Interest Rates: 10-year Treasury constant maturity (GS10) and 3-month Treasury bill secondary market rate (TB3MS), monthly.
  2. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, NBER-based recession indicator for the United States (USREC), monthly.
  3. Published academic US return series: three factors (monthly and daily), five factors (2x3), momentum, and ten industry portfolios (daily), through August 2026.
  4. Long-run monthly S&P Composite data (price, dividends, earnings and consumer prices), latest month September 2024.
  5. R. David McLean and Jeffrey Pontiff, "Does Academic Research Destroy Stock Return Predictability?", Journal of Finance 71(1), 2016.

Series downloaded from FRED®, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; this page is not endorsed or certified by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The Fama/French data are copyright Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French. None of the sources endorse the calculations here, and any error in them is ours. Past returns, including every figure on this page, do not predict future results, and nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell anything.

Spotted an error, or want a question covered? Write to hello@surossystems.com. A correction is made on this page, with the date it was made.
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